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Emissions Trading  
A Transatlantic Journey for an Idea
Katja Biedenkopf
Abstract
This paper examines the ways in which the EU greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading system (ETS) af-
fected the design of similar programs in North America. It investigates the conditions under which EU 
pioneering policy can play a role in extra-EU jurisdictions’ policy-making. The empirical investigation finds 
that the EU’s promotion of emissions trading was successful to some extent. The EU did not influence or 
trigger the inception of GHG emissions trading programs in North America. The EU ETS, however, played a 
role in the design process of the North American programs. Actors learned from elements of the EU system. 
Domestic North American factors were the triggers and drivers of the agenda-setting stage and dominated 
the policy adoption stage while the EU ETS significantly contributed to the policy formulation processes. 
The EU ETS played a role at the technical level rather than at the level of political deliberations and decision-
making. The EU’s policy promotion efforts depended on the demand in North America. The resonance and 
receptiveness in North America were decisive factors. The EU was not an importunate persuader. Learning 
from the ETS was to a significant part demand-driven.
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1.  Introduction1
This paper examines the ways in which the European Union (EU) greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading 
system (ETS) affected the design of similar programs in North America. It investigates the conditions under 
which EU pioneering policy can play a role in extra-EU jurisdictions’ policy-making. The idea of emissions 
trading was first implemented in the 1990s in the US for sulphur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxide (NOX) 
emissions. In the international negotiations leading to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, the US government pushed 
for the inclusion of GHG emissions trading but ultimately never ratified the Protocol. In the following years, 
GHG emissions trading gained support in the EU and became one of the cornerstones of EU climate policy. 
In the mid-2000s, some US states and Canadian provinces initiated subnational regional GHG emission 
trading programs. The EU promoted the idea of GHG emissions trading in North America. EU ETS experts 
from the UK were seconded to California and a number of ETS experts gave presentations to and interacted 
with actors involved in the design of the North American emissions trading programs. The emergence of 
the North American GHG emissions trading programs could thus have been the result of the EU’s policy 
promotion but they could also have been the result of the previous domestic experience with SO2 and NOX 
emissions trading. The study presented in this paper analyzes to what extent the EU’s policy promotion 
efforts were successful and affected policy developments in North America. It provides an answer to the 
questions: Were North American GHG emissions trading programs affected by the EU ETS? If yes, in what 
way and under what conditions?
The empirical investigation finds that the EU’s promotion of emissions trading was successful to some 
extent. The EU did not influence or trigger the inception of GHG emissions trading programs in North 
America. The EU ETS, however, played a role in the design process of the North American programs. Actors 
learned from elements of the EU system. Domestic North American factors were the triggers and drivers 
of the agenda-setting stage and dominated the policy adoption stage while the EU ETS made a significant 
contribution to the policy formulation processes. The EU ETS played a role at the technical level rather than 
at the level of political deliberations and decision-making. The EU’s policy promotion efforts depended on 
the demand in North America. The resonance and receptiveness in North America were decisive factors. 
The EU was not an importunate persuader. Learning from the ETS was to a significant part demand-driven. 
This corresponds to the findings of other recent research on the influence of EU external climate change 
policies (Torney 2012). North American actors searched for information about the ETS. The supply of les-
sons learned by EU actors took place in different forms; mostly through presentations and in the case of the 
Western Climate Initiative through the secondment of EU experts.
This paper aims to make a contribution to literature on policy diffusion and to the emerging field of EU ex-
ternal governance (Knill/Tosun 2009; Lavenex et al. 2009; Lavenex/Schimmelfennig 2009; Schimmelfennig 
2009; Kelemen 2010; Damro 2012), in particular to the study of the EU’s “leadership by example” and 
its policy promotion abroad. The analysis provides insights into the processes and conditions of external 
effects of EU policy in the absence of binding international commitments and coercive pressure. These 
1 The author would The research presented in this working paper was funded by the KFG “The Transformative Power 
of Europe”. The author is particularly grateful for the support by Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse as well as the help-
ful comments by many other KFG colleagues. The author also would like to thank the interviewees for making the 
time to share their valuable insights. 
6 | KFG Working Paper No. 45 | September 2012 
processes are based on horizontal direct and indirect interaction between equal partners as opposed to 
a hierarchical relationship in which the EU could use its leverage, for example in the form of conditional-
ity (Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2004), to coerce a policy change abroad (Knill/Tosun 2009). The US also 
never ratified the Kyoto Protocol with its binding commitments. Horizontal interaction includes demand-
driven processes in which extra-EU actors actively search for lessons from EU policy and the EU remains 
passive, as well as supply-driven processes in which EU actors actively promote lessons drawn from EU 
policies. This demarcates the limits of what would be labeled EU external governance. Instances in which 
extra-EU jurisdictions spontaneously take over EU policy solely based on their own decision and as a result 
of externalities of EU policy are not considered in the scope of external governance. They are however a 
substantive part of policy diffusion studies. The concept of EU external governance involves some purpose-
ful involvement of the EU in the diffusion process and can be described as institutionally backed cases of 
active regulatory export. External influence through networks and diplomatic intergovernmental relations 
are included in governance because the EU actively engages in these cases (Lavenex 2011). This paper 
mainly focuses on learning processes since – as shown below – this was found the dominant transfer 
mechanism in the case of GHG emissions trading from the EU to North American states and provinces. The 
in-depth analysis of the micro level processes of the transfer of (elements of) the EU ETS contributes to 
understanding the conditions under which the EU can effectively affect and promote policy developments 
beyond its borders.
The following section explains the idea of emissions trading and traces the history of its implementation in 
the EU and North America. Section three discusses the different transfer mechanisms and domestic factors 
that constitute the analytical framework on which the empirical investigation is based. Section four pres-
ents the results of the study and section five concludes with a discussion of the implications of the study for 
EU external governance more generally.
2. Emissions Trading
This section provides the background to the study presented in this paper. It first explains the basic pa-
rameters of emissions trading programs. Then it traces the history of emissions trading in the US and the 
EU in a chronological order. Emissions trading was first adopted by the US federal government. The EU 
took over the pioneering role after the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. In the mid-2000s, US states and 
Canadian provinces took on the idea and initiated subnational regional GHG emissions trading programs 
in the absence of federal rules.
2.1  The Idea of Emissions Trading
The idea to reduce harmful emissions by setting a maximum ceiling for certain emissions and then permit-
ting emitters to trade emission allowances first emerged in the 1960s. The idea can be traced back to the 
Canadian economics professor John H. Dales. In his 1968 book “Pollution, Property and Price”, he laid out 
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the basic logic of solving pollution problems through trading emissions permits (Dales 1968). He, however, 
never actively advocated this policy instrument and it took until the 1990s for its first large-scale implemen-
tation, which was the US SO2 emissions trading system.
In emissions trading systems a jurisdiction-wide maximum emissions limit is set instead of prescribing lim-
its for each emitter such as production plants. The emitters within the covered territory are assigning emis-
sion allowances. The number of allowances in the possession of an emitter must match its actual emissions. 
Excess allowances can be sold to other emitters or sometimes saved for the future. Excess emissions must 
be covered by the purchase of extra allowances from other emitters. The allowance price varies accord-
ing to demand and supply. It is left to the emitters to decide for the economically most viable solution of 
either buying allowances or investing in emission reduction measures. The choice of reduction measures is 
free. No specific technologies are prescribed. Emissions trading is a market-based policy instrument whose 
proclaimed advantages are cost-effectiveness, innovation fostering and flexibility in achieving an overall 
emissions reduction goal (Tietenberg 2006; van Asselt 2010: 126).
2.2  US Pioneering Efforts in the 1990s
The US pioneered in the introduction of emissions trading systems in the 1990s. Through an amendment 
of the Clean Air Act, a nation-wide SO2 emissions trading system was introduced. It achieved its goal and 
is generally considered a success (Bluemel 2008: 225-226). In the first years, emissions dropped tremen-
dously – far below the overall emissions limit and allowances issued (Schmalensee et al. 1998). The 1990 
Clean Air Act amendment also initiated the introduction of a NOX emissions trading system, which was 
implemented in 2003. This was, however, not a nation-wide system. It applied to 12 states2 and was, thus, 
the first large-scale regional emissions trading initiative (Ellerman 2000).
In the late 1990s, US federal policy changed course with regard to emissions trading. While President 
Clinton’s administration strongly advocated the inclusion of GHG emissions trading in the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol (Depledge 2000: 82-86), back home the tides had changed. In June 1997, Senator Robert Byrd 
(Democrat, West Virginia) and Senator Charles Hagel (Republican, Nebraska) introduced a resolution stat-
ing that the US should not sign any international climate change agreement that a) would mandate new 
commitments for the US unless it also mandates commitments for developing countries, and that b) would 
“result in serious harm to the United States’ economy” (US Senate 1997). The Senate – the part of the 
legislature that is constitutionally required to ratify any international agreement – adopted the resolu-
tion unanimously. Although President Clinton signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1998, he never submitted it to 
Senate for ratification. In March 2001, his successor President George W. Bush announced the US’ with-
drawal from the Kyoto Protocol (Steurer 2003; Sussman 2004; Harrison 2007). The US thus never ratified 
the Protocol.
2 Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
Maryland, Delaware and the District of Columbia.
8 | KFG Working Paper No. 45 | September 2012 
2.3 The EU Taking Over Pioneership
In the international negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol, the US fiercely advocated the inclusion of GHG 
emissions trading (Depledge 2000: 82-86) and the EU only reluctantly accepted the US demand (Damro/
Luaces Méndez 2003, Harrison 2010: 80-82, van Asselt 2010: 126-127). Following the adoption of the Kyoto 
Protocol and its ratification in Europe, the EU implemented a GHG emissions trading system in the 2000s, 
which has become an essential part of its climate change policy mix (Bye/Bruvoll 2008; Child et al. 2008). 
In the design of the EU ETS, the US experiences played an influential role. US consultants were involved in 
the drafting of a report that built the basis for an EU Green Paper put forward in 2000 (Skœrseth/Wettestad 
2010: 67-68). The Emissions Trading Directive was adopted in 2003 and trading started in January 2005 
(European Council 2003). In 2009, a reformed emissions trading system for the period 2013-2020 was 
agreed (European Council 2009; Oberthür/Pallemaerts 2010: 35-36, 46-52).
A policy instrument that was agreed with reluctance in Kyoto has become “the core climate change in-
strument for the EU” (Faure/Peeters 2008: 4). The EU has become a pioneer in supranational GHG emis-
sions trading (Ellerman/Buchner 2007: 67-69; Skœrseth/Wettestad 2009; Wurzel/Connelly 2011: 7-8). 
Introducing its ETS was one of the main policy actions of the EU’s effort to reduce its GHG emissions. The 
EU ETS is the world’s largest emissions trading scheme. It covers over 10,000 energy and industrial plants 
and includes the aviation sector since 2012. In 2012, the European Commission started consultations on 
the option of including the shipping sector into its emissions trading scheme. The sectors included in the 
system by 2011 are responsible for about 50 percent of the EU’s CO2 emissions. Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein joined the system in 2008.
2.4 Unsuccessful North American Federal Initiatives in the 2000s
While the EU proceeded with the adoption of the ETS, the 2000s also witnessed a number of legisla-
tive attempts on the matter in the US. In January 2003, US Senator Joseph Lieberman (Democrat, later 
Independent, Connecticut) and Senator John McCain (Republican, Arizona) introduced a legislative pro-
posal for a Climate Stewardship Act (S. 139) that included provisions on the introduction of a US nation-
wide GHG emissions trading system. This bill, however, was not adopted. In the following congressional 
sessions similar proposals were submitted but not adopted (Paltsev et al. 2003; Selin/VanDeveer 2009: 
128-129). In the absence of legally binding rules, a financial services company initiated a voluntary GHG 
emissions trading scheme – the Chicago Climate Exchange – which began operating in 2003. In 2008, about 
300 companies participated (Meckling 2011: 139-142). Yet, in 2010, it ceded operations because trading 
had stalled and the price had fallen to under 10 US Cents from over 7.50 US Dollars in 2008.
With President Obama taking office in 2009, a new attempt to introduce an emissions trading system was 
undertaken. This time around, most supporters were more optimistic than in previous congressional ses-
sions, given the Democratic majorities in both houses of the legislature. Representative Henry Waxman 
(Democrat, California) and Representative Edward Markey (Democrat, Massachusetts) introduced the 
American Clean Energy and Security Act (H.R. 2454) in May 2009. This bill passed the House with a vote of 
219 against 212. Subsequently, Senator John Kerry (Democrat, Massachusetts) and Senator Barbara Boxer 
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(Democrat, California) introduced a similar legislative proposal, also including an emissions trading system, 
in the Senate. The Senate plenary did not vote upon this bill and consequently did not adopt it. With this, 
the legislative effort failed (Harrison 2010: 92; Betsill/Hoffmann 2011: 83-84).
Contrary to the US, Canada ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002. Yet, the federal government has been 
criticized for a lack of activities addressing climate change. GHG emissions rose compared to 1990 levels 
instead of the 6 percent reduction pledged in Kyoto. With the Conservative government taking office in 
2006, the climate change discourse and efforts shifted towards less ambitious action (Stoett 2009). Canada 
withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2011.
2.5 The Emergence of North American Subnational Emissions Trading Initiatives
While the idea of emissions trading did not materialize in any concrete federal action to reduce GHG emis-
sions, a number of US states as well as Canadian provinces began filling the federal regulatory void. This 
development is not only a climate change policy phenomenon; also in other environmental areas, indi-
vidual states introduced their own laws given federal inaction. More than half of the US states introduced 
CO2 reduction targets and a mix of different climate change policies, amongst them emissions trading pro-
grams. Three subnational regional GHG emissions trading systems were initiated in the course of the 2000s 
– the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) and the Midwest 
Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord (MGGRA).
RGGI was the first and until 2012 the only implemented US GHG emissions trading program. In 2005, 
the Northeastern states of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and 
Vermont signed a Memorandum of Understanding creating RGGI. Later, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and 
Maryland joined the initiative. In 2011, New Jersey’s governor decided to withdraw from the program. In 
response, the New Jersey legislature voted in favor of the state remaining part of RGGI. The Memorandum 
of Understanding sets the goal of a stabilization of CO2 emissions as established for each of the states until 
the year 2015 and then for each of the four years 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 a reduction of 2.5 percent 
so that by the end of 2018 a 10 percent reduction is achieved. A model rule was agreed jointly. Each 
participating state established a CO2 emissions cap – based on the agreement – in its respective territory 
through state legislation. Emitters can trade allowances within the entire RGGI region. The initiative covers 
CO2 emissions from electricity generators (Bluemel 2008: 227-231; Rabe 2009: 77; Selin/VanDeveer 2009: 
120-123).
WCI included Arizona, California, New Mexico, Oregon and Washington State at the time of its inception 
in February 2007 (Bluemel 2008: 232-234). Later, Utah, Montana and the Canadian provinces British 
Columbia, Ontario, Quebec and Manitoba joined the initiative. A number of other US states, Canadian 
provinces and Mexican states participated as observers. Apart from California, the other US states later 
withdrew from the discussions (Betsill/Hoffmann 2011: 83). In September 2008, WCI issued design recom-
mendations for an emissions trading system to start in 2012. WCI establishes a framework for an emissions 
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trading program for multiple sectors and emissions (Engel/Orbach 2008: 126). Its scope is broader than 
that of RGGI. On 12 January 2012, WCI partners presented the 2012 implementation timeline of what is 
likely to become the largest carbon market in North America. California and Quebec are likely to go ahead 
in 2012 and introduce the WCI emissions trading program. Other provinces and states are expected to join 
the initiative at a later point in time.
In November 2007, the Midwestern states of Wisconsin, Minnesota, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Kansas and 
the Canadian province Manitoba agreed MGGRA. This group aimed at designing a joint emissions trading 
system (Bluemel 2008: 234-235). A stakeholder group developed a model rule, which was, however, not 
picked up by any of the participating states or province. These MGGRA plans thus have not been imple-
mented and it seems that there is a tacit assumption that it probably never will.
As the discussion above shows, US activities pertaining to GHG emissions trading are numerous with a 
number of them failing in the policy-making (federal bills) or implementation (MGGRA) process. RGGI, 
however, is an operating system and WCI is well on its way to become operational in 2012. Emissions trad-
ing in the US is thus characterized by regional subnational – one of them cross-border – initiatives, so far. 
The three North American subnational GHG emissions trading initiatives vary with regard to their design, 
success and timing. For this reason, they are instructive case studies for a comparative analysis. RGGI was 
adopted earlier than WCI and MGGRA and is already implemented. WCI is likely to be implemented in 2012 
and MGGRA seems unlikely to ever be implemented. RGGI is mildly ambitious, while WCI has high ambi-
tions. The level of ambition of MGGRA was comparatively low.
3.  Transfer Mechanisms and Domestic Factors  
The EU’s and some of its Member States’ promotion of GHG emissions trading in North America and the 
timing of the emergence of the North American subnational regional programs suggest that these pro-
grams could have been affected by the ETS. This section outlines the possible processes through which 
the EU ETS could have affected the North American initiatives. It develops an analytical framework based 
on transfer mechanisms and domestic factors, which provided the basis for the study of the role of the 
EU ETS in the three North American emissions trading initiatives presented in section four. The process of 
the transatlantic journey of the ETS is conceptualized in two steps. First, the EU policy affects the policy 
positions and strategies of North American actors through one of the mechanisms – learning, emulation 
and competition considerations. Whether or not these actors are receptive to effects through one or more 
mechanisms depends on domestic factors – namely the politics and policy problem. Second, the actors 
with revised policy positions and strategies engage in their domestic policy-making process, which is deter-
mined by domestic factors. These are the politics, institutions and policy problem.
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3.1 Transfer Mechanisms
Learning, emulation and competition could be plausible mechanisms through which the EU ETS could have 
affected the North American initiatives. Academic literature identifies various mechanisms through which 
EU policy could affect North American policy (for an overview see for example Börzel/Risse 2012; Gilardi 
2012). Some of these mechanisms – international agreements and coercive measures – can, however, be 
excluded. Learning and emulation could be possible explanations and therefore provide the basis for the 
empirical investigation. The lobbying in favor of GHG emissions trading programs by multinational com-
panies motivated by competition considerations cannot be excluded for one of the three North American 
programs, namely the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) and was therefore included in the empirical 
investigation.
Learning could explain the transfer of the idea of GHG emissions trading from the EU to North America. 
Learning takes place when actors – which are involved in the North American policy-making processes – 
draw lessons from information about the EU ETS and consequently update (parts of) their policy positions 
and strategies. Learning describes the cognitive process of analyzing EU policy. The result of learning can 
be the revision or corroboration of actors’ policy positions so that they pursue policy options similar to 
EU policy in the North American policy-making process or, the opposite case, so that they pursue policy 
options different from the EU policy, which would be a case of negative learning (Levy 1994: 290; Löfstedt/
Vogel 2001: 400; Weyland 2009: 392-393, 399-401; Gilardi 2012). Most actors in most instances draw les-
sons in a bounded manner. They are not aware of all available information and they do not strive to do so. 
Rather, actors have certain ideologies and worldviews that make them weigh certain information more and 
neglect other (Simon 1965; Meseguer 2006).
Emulation could also explain EU effects on North America. Emulation occurs when actors that are involved 
in the North American policy-making process change or feel corroborated in their policy position and strat-
egy based on their belief that EU policy is a legitimate and appropriate measure that should also be intro-
duced in their jurisdiction (March/Olsen 1989: 23, 160-162). In contrast to learning, emulation is based on 
superficial observation of EU policy instead of deeper analysis. Emulation can be normative or mimetic. 
Normative emulation is based on the adherence of US actors to norms and beliefs that make them assess 
EU policy as appropriate. Mimetic emulation is based on a high esteem of the EU and the perception of 
the EU and its policies as successful and desirable (Finnemore/Sikkink 1998: 891, 901, 906; Polillo/Guillén 
2005; Shipan/Volden 2008: 842-843). Emulation includes cases in which actors use EU policy to justify a 
policy position that they have supported for a long time (Dolowitz 2006: 268). 
Learning and emulation can be demand- or supply-driven processes. North American actors can actively 
search for information about the ETS and learning or emulation can thus be driven by their demand. The 
EU can, however, also engage in the promotion of its policy abroad. This can spur the transfer process. 
Learning and emulation processes could consequently be seen as moving along a continuum between 
demand- and supply-driven impetuses.
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A competition- and trade-related mechanism could additionally explain transatlantic effects in the case of 
WCI. Companies that are active in the EU and in North America could have pushed for a policy similar to 
the EU policy in North America in an effort to level the playing field with competitors that are exclusively 
active in North America. Companies that are active in the EU had to invest in compliance with the EU ETS. 
These companies are competing with North American companies that did not have to invest in EU compli-
ance. This could incite actors to push for a similar policy so that the same investment must be made by 
all market actors (Vogel 1997). This mechanism seems only a likely explanation in the case of one of the 
North American GHG emissions trading programs. The two other programs only cover electricity genera-
tors, which are mostly local and regional as opposed to trans- or multinational companies. Only the WCI 
covers industry sectors such as iron, steel, cement, glass, pulp and paper, in which multinational companies 
can be found. Since these sectors are also included in the EU ETS, they could have pushed for the adoption 
of GHG emissions trading in North America with the reason that they would level the playing field with 
domestic competitors that do not operate on the EU market.
While the EU ETS could have affected North American emissions trading through one or a combination 
of these three mechanisms, domestic factors could be an alternative explanation. In this case, the EU 
ETS would not have played a role in the North American process. Additionally, domestic factors in North 
America can explain the scope conditions under which the different mechanisms occur and the transfer of 
ETS elements is more likely. In the event of influence of the EU ETS on the North American initiatives, the 
interplay between transatlantic effects and domestic factors appears likely. The EU ETS could have played 
a prominent or minor role in the inception, design and adoption of North American emissions trading 
programs. It could only have fed in specific aspects of GHG emissions trading at specific points of the North 
American policy-making process. It could, however, also have been the main trigger and blueprint for the 
North American programs. A nuanced view of policy transfer is thus proposed. The EU ETS as such could 
have affected the developments in North America but it could also have been certain elements of it at 
certain stages of the policy cycle. This depends on the receptiveness and fit of the North American factors 
with the EU ETS. The section below discusses these domestic factors and links them to the mechanisms.
3.2 Domestic Factors
Domestic factors provide explanations for whether and to what extent North American states and provinces 
are receptive to effects of the EU ETS. Three groups of domestic factors are distinguished: politics, institu-
tions and the policy problem. In the first step of the process – the EU policy affecting the policy positions 
and strategies of North American actors through one of the mechanisms – the politics and policy problem 
factors play a twofold role. On the one hand, they could be alternative explanations to the influence of the 
EU ETS in explaining the emergence of emissions trading initiatives in North America. Instead of learning, 
emulation and competition-motivated explanations, the existence of the policy problem of climate change 
and the political considerations and convictions of the involved stakeholders could provide an explanation 
for the inception and the design of RGGI, WCI and MGGRA. However, they can also explain the likelihood of 
actors to engage in learning and emulation. In the second step of the process – actors with revised policy 
positions and strategies engaging in their domestic policy-making process, which can lead to policy output 
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affected by EU policy – the three groups of domestic factors can provide explanations for the likelihood of 
the transatlantic journey of the EU ETS.
The politics factors relate to the political majority constellations in the legislature and to the ideologies 
of relevant stakeholders. The ideology of actors makes them more or less likely to be receptive to the 
ETS (bounded learning). The number of receptive actors determines whether they can find a majority to 
push their ideas to adoption. The overall political context in which they act determines their strategies 
and actions because they are ultimately pursuing what they perceive as their interest in the sense of their 
political career and their political goals. Since policy-making can be described as struggle between different 
advocacy groups and interests (Dowding 1995: 150), whether there is sufficient support and leadership 
on an issue is important for a policy measure’s successful adoption (Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2004: 
664-665; Lavenex/Schimmelfennig 2009: 805). Political support for a policy similar to the EU ETS appears 
more likely in jurisdictions in which the majority of relevant stakeholders adhere to ideologies that are 
compatible with the basic premises of the EU policy (Katz et al. 1963: 249-250). Fitting with the ideologies 
does not necessarily mean that they must be the same. Ideology can be different but nevertheless fit with 
the basic ideas and concepts of EU policy. The political context can provide explanations for why or why not 
politicians engage in pursuing and advocating certain policy measures (Meseguer/Gilardi 2009: 533-534). 
The ideologies of the actors involved in the North American policy-making process make them thus more 
or less receptive to learning and emulation. They provide explanations for the occurrence and strength of 
these two mechanisms. Additionally, the political majority constellations provide explanations for whether 
and when the actors that learned from or emulated the EU ETS can successfully push for their (revised) 
policy position so that it is reflected in the policy output.
Institutions define the framework in which the politics take place (March/Olsen 1989: 18). Institutions, 
defined broadly, include the ways in which jurisdictions and their policy-making process are organized, al-
ready existing policy as well as broadly-accepted norms that shape a jurisdiction’s identity (Gurowitz 2006: 
310-311). Next to the political context that shapes actors’ strategies, the institutional context shapes what 
options they have and how many actors are required to push for an idea. The framework of formal policy-
making procedures and informal norms can provide opportunities and constraints for policy-relevant state 
and non-state actors to pursue their preferred policy option (Deutsch 1966: 147). Formal institutional ar-
rangements can facilitate or make it more difficult for actors to gain access to the policy-making process. 
The number of access points to the policy-making process and of veto points for policy-makers to block 
policy proposals can influence the result of the policy-making process. Some political systems can make 
it more difficult than others to introduce radical policy change (Immergut 1990; Cortell 1997: 395-396). 
Informal institutions such as norms and customs embedded in a given jurisdiction’s political culture can 
also facilitate or obstruct the introduction of certain policy measures (Risse-Kappen 1994: 208-212). A third 
institutional element is path dependencies resulting from existing policies and infrastructures (Levi 1997: 
28-29; Sedelmeier 2006: 12). The institutional factors thus provide additional explanations for whether and 
when learners and emulators can successfully advocate policies affected by the EU ETS.
The policy problem factors relate to the existence and framing of the problem regarding the policy in ques-
tion. It appears more likely that a large enough group of actors in a jurisdiction is receptive to advocating 
GHG emissions trading when it is faced with a problem that requires such a policy response. In cases in 
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which US states and Canadian provinces face a policy problem that can be addressed with a measure simi-
lar to a given EU policy, actors are more inclined to introduce policies on the issue (Hays 1996; Gilardi et al. 
2009). Not only the objective existence of a policy problem but also the way in which actors frame it within 
the policy debate is an important factor. Climate change is a global problem affecting Europe and North 
America in similar ways. Yet, policy-makers, stakeholders and the public frame this problem differently in 
regard to its severity, the anthropogenic impact and the appropriate means to respond to it. This can lead 
to very different conclusions as to whether and with what means climate change should be addressed, 
which relates to the ideology of actors and the politics factors. Additionally, whether or not policy-makers 
and other stakeholders perceive this problem as urgent and a priority affects how much effort they put into 
their advocacy in favor of their preferred policy option. The framing of the policy problem as for example an 
environmental, economic or financial problem also affects the way in which a policy measure is designed 
(Tews 2005: 69-70; Princen/Rhinard 2006: 1121; Lavenex/Wichmann 2009: 98). The existence and framing 
of the policy problem contributes thus to explaining whether actors are receptive to learning and emula-
tion because if a solution to a problem is needed this appears more likely. Moreover, the presence and 
broad recognition of a policy problem related to GHG emissions affects the politics, making it difficult to 
oppose a related policy measure.
3.3 Research Methods
The potential transatlantic effects of the EU ETS were examined with a qualitative comparative case study 
approach. This method can capture the complexities and a broad range of different aspects of the process. 
Actors’ motivations and interpersonal dynamics can be captured as well as situations of equifinality. The 
study is largely based on 32 elite interviews. The sampling for the interviews was based on the identifica-
tion of the key actors in the design of the GHG emissions trading programs.
The actors that have been most involved in the process are deemed to be the most appropriate intervie-
wees for providing insights into the detailed processes that took place. Through targeted open-ended 
questions, elements of the way the process took place could be reconstructed and causal links between the 
EU ETS and the North American programs could be investigated. Approximately ten interviews were con-
ducted for each of the three programs. Given that the number of persons involved in these processes was 
relatively small, a relatively broad share of key actors was interviewed. The number of interviews enables 
triangulation, thus verifying the statements of one interviewee through the statements of others. For the 
purpose of triangulation, a broad coverage of persons that were intensely involved and interviewees rang-
ing from state officials and academics to NGO and business representatives were included. The criterion for 
choice of interviewee was their level of involvement in the process. A subsequent comparison between the 
cases can help confirm some of the results of the within-case analysis.
The interviews started with a question about the interviewees’ assessment of the main reasons for the in-
troduction of the respective GHG emissions trading program. This question aimed at investigating whether 
the EU ETS was considered a trigger or whether domestic or other external factors were considered having 
triggered the processes leading to the different initiatives. This was followed by a set of questions related 
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to the politics, institutional and policy problem factors. Only then, the role of the EU ETS was directly 
mentioned. It was asked whether the ETS played a role and if so what kind of a role. Direct and indirect 
contacts between EU and North American actors were investigated and specificities of the role of the EU 
ETS focused upon. The results of this survey are presented in section four below.
4. The Role of the EU ETS in North American Initiatives
The empirical analysis shows that the EU ETS played a role in the North American GHG emissions trading 
programs. Every interviewee confirmed this. The ETS contributed mainly to the design phase of the pro-
grams, once the initiative was taken and the political support existed. Domestic factors were the triggers for 
the initiatives. They explain their inception and also the decline of some of them. The ETS’s role could be 
described as a reference point, guiding elements of the program design in certain directions. The dominant 
mechanism was learning, which took place at the technical rather than the political level. The sections be-
low first present the results of the study on the triggers of the three emissions trading initiatives and then 
on the role of the EU ETS in the process.
4.1 Triggers of the Initiatives
The empirical analysis revealed that the EU ETS was not the trigger that led to the inception of the three 
North American GHG emissions trading programs. When asked for their assessment of the reasons for 
the respective program’s inception, all interviewees mentioned exclusively domestic factors. The politics 
factors were the main trigger for the three initiatives. At the time of their inception, climate change was 
regarded as a problem that requires policy responses in the respective states. The inaction of the federal 
level led to a general recognition amongst many state politicians of the need for state level responses. This 
problem recognition and framing changed in the course of time towards the end of the first decade of the 
2000s. The institutional framework of the US and Canadian constitutions enabled the states and provinces 
to move ahead with their emissions trading policy given the absence of federal activity.
The lack of federal climate regulation was mentioned most frequently by interviewees (RGGI 82 percent, 
WCI 92 percent, MGGRA 100 percent) in all three cases as the trigger of the programs’ inception. The 
answers were accompanied by an implicit or explicit recognition that climate change was a problem that 
needed to be addressed through policy measures. At the time of inception of the programs, there was a 
growing overall political recognition of the need for climate policy. Federal action in the administration suc-
ceeding President Bush – regardless of whether a Republican or Democratic politician was elected – was 
anticipated. In the cases of RGGI and WCI, most interviewees stated that the respective states wanted to 
push the federal level to become active on climate change. Demonstrating that GHG emissions trading was 
feasible and successful as well as building up pressure on the federal government to act were dominant 
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drivers, both in RGGI and WCI.3 In the case of MGGRA, the reasons linked to federal inaction had a slightly 
different angle. Not pushing the federal government to become active on meaningful climate policy but 
rather making sure that the Midwest was ahead of the curve of the anticipated federal policy was the 
motivation. The states wanted to set an example that reflected the particular interests of the participat-
ing Midwestern states.4 This could be seen as a counterbalance to RGGI and WCI, which aimed at more 
ambitious goals and were introduced in regions with different economic structures and electoral demands. 
While filling the federal void drove all three programs, their particular strategy was nevertheless different. 
RGGI and WCI strove to set ambitious examples and tried to put pressure on the federal government for 
federal regulation while MGGRA wanted to set an alternative example reflecting their interests and rather 
acted out of expectation that federal regulation was unavoidable.
US federal climate policy seemed very likely in the period prior to the election of President Obama and in 
the first two years after his election. Both presidential candidates in the 2008 election campaign spoke out 
in favor of climate regulation in case of their election. Republican candidate John McCain co-sponsored 
emissions trading legislative proposals in 2003, 2005 and 2007 in the US Senate and in his presidential 
campaign he supported a trading system to cut US emissions 60 percent below 1990 levels by 2050 (Clark 
2008). Democratic candidate and later President Barak Obama promised federal climate legislation and 
supported the efforts of Representatives Waxman and Markey when they proposed the American Clean 
Energy and Security Act (H.R. 2454) in May 2009. This bill passed the House of Representatives but failed 
in Senate (Harrison 2010: 92; Betsill/Hoffmann 2011: 83-84). There was thus a period of time during which 
the overall expectations of federal climate legislation were very high and most observers anticipated the 
federal government to act. This set the general framework in which the state-level policy-makers acted. 
They tried to push for and shape federal policy. RGGI falls into the period of the Bush presidency dur-
ing which federal regulation was very unlikely but the program was driven by the motivation to build up 
pressure on the federal level. WCI was initiated slightly later but followed similar reasoning. MGGRA was 
incepted in the anticipation of federal policy and with the reasoning of shaping this policy so that it reflects 
particularities and concerns of the Midwestern states.
Gubernatorial leadership is the second most frequently mentioned factor in all three cases (RGGI 73 per-
cent, WCI 75 percent, MGGRA 57 percent). In the case of RGGI, all interviewees that referred to gubernato-
rial leadership mentioned the leadership of Governor George Pataki of New York State. He initiated RGGI by 
sending a letter to his fellow Northeastern governors, inviting them to start a process of joint climate policy 
3 Interviews: Environmental Think Tank, Washington, DC, 22 February 2012; Consultant on Energy, Climate and 
Regulatory Issues, Boston, 27 February 2012; Environmental NGO, Boston, 27 February 2012; Environmental NGO, 
New York, 28 February 2012; Environmental NGO, Washington, DC, 2 March 2012; Environmental NGO, Boston, 
7 March 2012; Environmental NGO, Boston, 8 March 2012; Energy Utility, Winnipeg, 26 April 2012; Government 
Agency, Tucson, 26 April 2012; Government Agency, Denver, 1 May 2012; Environment Department, Santa Fe, 9 May 
2012; Environmental NGO, Seattle, 9 May 2012; Environment Department, Olympia, 10 May 2012; Environmental 
Department, Helena, 22 May 2012; Environmental NGO, Seattle, 23 May 2012; Government Agency, Sacramento, 
25 May 2012.
4 Interviews: Environmental Agency, Springfield, 24 May 2012; Environmental NGO, Washington, DC, 11 May 2012; 
Environmental Department, Lansing, 1 May 2012; Commerce Department, Springfield, 7 May 2012; Industry, St. 
Paul, 30 April 42012; Agricultural Organization, Washington, DC, 23 April 2012; Academic, Washington, DC, 1 May 
2012.
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based on GHG emissions trading. Governor Pataki was referred to as a driving force behind the process, 
supporting and facilitating the inception and design of RGGI.5 In the case of WCI, Governor Schwarzenegger 
was mentioned by a number of interviewees. He made climate change one of his priorities and pushed for 
the adoption of the California climate law AB 32. He also engaged in a dialogue with other Western gover-
nors. Interviewees report, however, that individual governors in the different states took on leadership in 
their particular state and engaged in the WCI process. Most of the states had different climate policies and 
plans already. The participation in a regional effort was considered contributing to the existing efforts and 
an opportunity for governors to demonstrate leadership.6 In the case of MGGRA, gubernatorial leadership 
also played a role. In this case it was a number of governors. Governors Pawlenty of Minnesota and Doyle of 
Wisconsin were mentioned as leading supporters of the program. In some states, the personal conviction 
of the governor played a major role even in the absence of broad support by the legislature, which was 
the case in Montana. In other states, such as Washington State and Oregon, the governors enjoyed broad 
support from their electorate and legislatures.7
The federal system of the US and Canada provided the possibilities for different governors and premiers to 
go ahead with their own climate initiatives in the absence of federal action. The US and Canadian constitu-
tions provide for relatively broad leeway for subnational action in policy areas that are not regulated by 
the federal level. In addition to these formal institutional frameworks, the existence of state climate policy 
prior to the inception of the GHG emissions trading programs provided a basis that the RGGI, WCI and 
MGGRA efforts could be built upon. The relatively favorable institutional factors were complemented by 
the favorable politics at the time of the inception of the programs. Different governors attempted to show 
leadership and to gain popular support by acting in the conditions of federal inaction. Especially Governor 
Pataki was referred to by a number of interviewees as considering his leadership on RGGI as a way to gain 
a national profile. At the time, he was said to consider running for the Republican candidacy for President. 
According to some interviewees, Governor Schwarzenegger saw climate policy as one of his legacy issues 
and an area to assert himself as a leader. Political considerations and strategies played an important role, 
especially in the cases of the inception of RGGI and WCI. The broad recognition of climate change as a policy 
problem was a third factor contributing to the inception of the three GHG emissions trading initiatives.
5 Interviews: Consultant on Energy, Climate and Regulatory Issues, Boston, 27 February 2012; Environmental NGO, 
Boston, 27 February 2012; Environmental NGO, New York, 28 February 2012; Environmental NGO, Boston, 7 March 
2012; Office for Commonwealth Development, Boston, 12 March 2012; Grid Operator, Boston, 13 March 2012; 
Environmental Department, New York, 19 March 2012; Industry Association, Marlborough, 21 March 2012.
6 Interviews: Energy Utility, Winnipeg, 26 April 2012; Government Agency, Tucson, 26 April 2012; Government 
Agency, Denver, 1 May 2012; Environmental Department, Santa Fe, 9 May 2012; Environmental NGO, Seattle, 9 May 
2012; Environmental Department, Helena, 22 May 2012; Environmental NGO, Seattle, 23 May 2012; Government 
Department, London, 16 May 2012; Government Department, London, 23 May 2012.
7 Interviews: Government Agency, Tucson, 26 April 2012; Government Agency, Denver, 01 May 2012; Industry, St. 
Paul, 30 April 2012; Agricultural Organization, Washington, DC, 23 April 2012.
18 | KFG Working Paper No. 45 | September 2012 
4.2 The Role of the EU ETS and the Transfer Mechanisms
While domestic factors and not the EU ETS triggered the inception of the North American GHG emissions 
trading initiatives, the EU policy nevertheless played an important role in the North American process. 
Learning was the dominant transfer mechanism. Once the agreements between the different states and 
provinces were signed to set up the different regional initiatives, the EU ETS entered the scene. In the 
processes in which the model rules for the different programs were designed, the ETS was considered an 
example that actors drew lessons from. All interviewees were asked whether they think that the EU ETS 
played a role in the respective program and everyone confirmed this. Most interviewees used the term 
learning or described the process of drawing lessons from the EU’s experience. In the context of these 
learning activities, interviewees described aspects in which the ETS provided a positive example to draw 
lessons from. More often, however, interviewees described learning from the mistakes that the EU made 
in the first phase of the ETS. These lessons were also reflected in the EU’s revision of the ETS and improved 
in the second and third phase.
While all interviewees reported some kind of role for the EU ETS in the design process of the respective 
program rules, they stated that the ETS did not play a role in the political discourse. Some interviewees 
described that the politics were not favorable enough for such arguments. A number of politicians in the 
legislatures would consider a European policy model as non-aspirational. A reference to the EU ETS as a 
positive example would not fall on receptive grounds. For this reason, references to the ETS in political 
debates were rather rare.8 This hints at a low degree of emulation and a more dominant role of learning 
in the context of technical discussions in the design of the programs. Evidence for the mechanism related 
to economic interdependence was not found. Interviewees did not mention industry advocacy in favor of 
North American GHG emissions trading based on the reasoning of leveling the playing field with domestic 
competitors. Some interviewees reported that industries such as cement and glass manufacturing were 
opposed to WCI.9
In addition to the lessons from the EU ETS, especially in the case of RGGI but also WCI, domestic expertise 
on emissions trading from the SO2 and NOX programs was mentioned. The design of the RGGI model rule 
was based in parts on the NOX program that the states in that region had implemented in the early 2000s. 
In the case of WCI, some interviewees mentioned that the RGGI experience was taken into account in 
addition to lessons from the ETS and the SO2 program. The MGGRA process was portrayed by many inter-
viewees as less affected by lessons from other programs and rather inward-looking at the particularities of 
the region’s economy.
8 Interviews: Office for Commonwealth Development, Boston, 12 March 2012; Environmental Think Tank, Washington, 
DC, 22 February 2012; Environmental NGO, Boston, 8 March 2012; Environmental Department, New York, 19 
March 2012; Environment Ministry, Québec, 23/04/12; Energy Utility, Winnipeg, 26 April 2012; Government 
Agency, Tucson, 26 April 2012; Government Agency, Denver, 1 May 2012; Environmental Department, Olympia, 
10 May 2012; Environmental Department, Helena, 22 May 2012; Environmental NGO, Seattle, 23 May 2012; 
Environmental Department, Lansing, 1 May 2012; Commerce Department, Springfield, 7 May 2012; Industry, St. 
Paul, 30 April 2012; Agricultural Organization, Washington, DC, 23 April 2012.
9 Interviews: Environmental Department, Olympia, 10 May 2012; Environment Ministry, Québec, 23 April 2012; 
Environmental Department, Santa Fe, 9 May 2012; Environmental Department, Helena, 22 May 2012; Environmental 
NGO, Seattle, 23 May 2012.
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4.3 Contact Patterns and EU Policy Promotion 
The EU promoted its ETS through a number of direct contacts with North American actors to discuss the 
EU’s experiences, which enabled and facilitated learning activities. The intensity of the contacts, however, 
varied between the cases. In all three cases, interviewees reported of a number of incidences in which EU 
experts travelled to the US and gave presentations about the ETS.10 In the case of RGGI, a number of actors 
that were involved in the design of the model rule were in direct contact with ETS experts in the EU. This 
includes experts from the European Commissions and of EU Member State institutions. Especially the state 
officials that were mainly in charge of designing the RGGI model rule were reported to have had regular 
EU contacts. These state officials were familiar with the EU ETS.11 The contact mainly took the form of 
presentations by EU experts that had travelled to the US or Commission Delegation staff as well as e-mail 
and telephone contact.
In the case of WCI, the EU policy promotion through direct contact with North American actors was the 
strongest. Two EU ETS experts were seconded to California for an extended period of time during the 
program design phase. They were directly involved in a number of meetings and worked together with the 
actors designing WCI rules. One of these experts was based at the California Air Resources Board, the orga-
nization that is in charge of implementing California GHG emissions policy, and the second expert worked 
with the California Environmental Protection Agency and engaged with various actors and organizations. A 
third EU ETS expert was seconded to British Columbia. While these EU experts were sent by an EU Member 
State, namely the United Kingdom (UK), the European Commission contributed to the coordination of their 
activities. The reason for a Member State rather than the Commission sending experts to North America 
was, on the one hand, resources. The Commission’s resources for seconding an expert to promote its 
climate policies are relatively limited. On the other hand, the UK and California signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding that contained provisions on the exchange of experts. This provided a framework within 
which the sending of a UK official was facilitated.12
10 Interviews: Environmental NGO, Boston, 27 February 2012; Environmental NGO, New York, 28 February 2012; 
Environmental NGO, Boston, 7 March 2012; Office for Commonwealth Development, Boston, 12 March 2012; 
Environmental Department, New York, 19 March 2012; Government Agency, Tucson, 26 April 2012; Government 
Agency, Denver, 1May 2012; Environmental Department, Santa Fe, 9 May 2012; Environmental NGO, Seattle, 9 
May 2012; Environmental Department, Helena, 22 May 2012; Government Agency, Sacramento, 25 May 2012; 
Environmental Department, Lansing, 1 May 2012; Agricultural Organization, Washington, DC, 23 April 2012; 
Academic, Washington, DC, 1 May 2012; Government Department, London, 16 May 2012; Government Department, 
London, 23 May 2012.
11 Interviews: Consultant on Energy, Climate and Regulatory Issues, Boston, 27 February 2012; Environmental NGO, 
Boston, 27 February 2012; Environmental NGO, New York, 28 February 2012; Environmental NGO, Washington, DC, 
2 March 2012; Office for Commonwealth Development, Boston, 12 March 2012; Environmental Department, New 
York, 19 March 2012.
12 Interviews: Government Department, London, 16 May 2012; Government Department, London, 23 May 2012; 
Government Agency, Sacramento, 25 May 2012; Environmental Department, Helena, 22 May 2012; Environmental 
Department, Olympia, 10 May 2012; Environmental NGO, Seattle, 9 May 2012; Environmental Department, Santa 
Fe, 9 May 2012; Government Agency, Tucson, 26 April 2012; Environment Ministry, Québec, 23 April 2012.
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In the case of MGGRA, less intense direct contact with EU actors was found. Interviewees reported of con-
tacts between, in particular, the consultants of the design process and EU actors and of some presentations 
given by EU actors that had travelled to the US. Many of the other stakeholders involved in the process did 
not have direct contact with experts from the EU but rather gained information from intermediaries, in 
particular the consultants, and other sources of information such as specialized media.13 The promotion of 
the ETS by EU actors differed thus significantly between the three programs. The demand for such activity 
by North American actors played a role. More receptive actors engaged in more contacts with the EU. The 
EU seems to have followed a rather unobtrusive approach.
4.4 Transferred Elements 
The elements of the EU ETS of which North American actors drew lessons differed between RGGI, WCI and 
MGGRA. In the case of RGGI, most interviewees referred to lessons drawn from the EU’s decision to hand 
out most allowances for free in the first ETS phase. This led to windfall profits by some companies that re-
ceived allowances without costs and nevertheless charged their customers. Most interviewees mentioned 
that it was very important in the RGGI debate about whether to auction allowances or to distribute them 
without charge to be able to analyze and refer to the EU example. The ETS experience helped making the 
case in favor of auctioning, which was incorporated in the RGGI model rule.14 While the RGGI Memorandum 
of Understanding signed by the participating governors stipulates that 25 percent of allowances must be 
auctioned, in practice, almost 100 percent are auctioned. One interviewee mentioned that the ETS was 
important because it showed that trading on a regional scale could be done.15
In the case of WCI, interviewees referred to a number of elements that played a role. One element that 
was mentioned by interviewees is the importance of data. They reported that WCI designers drew the 
lesson from the ETS that solid baseline data is important to avoid over-allocation, which is what happened 
in the first ETS phase.16 Interviewees mentioned the security breaches that occurred in the EU with regard 
to the ETS registry as one aspect that WCI designers drew lessons from. These lessons from an EU mistake 
contributed to awareness of data security aspects in the WCI rules.17 The importance of a centralized body 
that has the power to enforce the GHG emissions trading program is a lesson that WCI designers were 
reported to have drawn from the ETS. However, given constitutional constraints, US states and Canadian 
provinces cannot transfer such powers to a jointly established organization. This would require approval 
13 Interviews: Environmental Agency, Springfield, 24 May 2012; Environmental NGO, Washington, DC, 11 May 2012; 
Environmental Department, Lansing, 1 May 2012; Commerce Department, Springfield, 7 May 2012; Industry, St. 
Paul, 30 April 2012; Agricultural Organization, Washington, DC, 23 April 2012.
14 Interviews: Consultant on Energy, Climate and Regulatory Issues, Boston, 27 February 2012; Environmental NGO, 
Boston, 27 February 2012; Environmental NGO, New York, 28 February 2012; Environmental NGO, Boston, 7 March 
2012; Environmental NGO, Boston, 8 March 2012; Office for Commonwealth Development, Boston, 12 March 
2012; Grid Operator, Boston, 13 March 2012; Environmental Department, New York, 19 March 2012.
15 Interview: Environmental NGO, Boston, 8 March 2012.
16 Interview: Environmental Department, Santa Fe, 9 May 2012; Government Department, London, 16 May 2012.
17 Interviews: Energy Utility, Winnipeg, 26 April 2012; Government Agency, Denver, 1 May 2012.
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of the federal Congress, which seems very unlikely.18 The ETS was referred to as an example that showed 
that GHG emissions trading was possible in a wealthy economy without major repercussions on economic 
growth.19 A number of interviewees mentioned that various elements with regard to the implementation 
and operation of the ETS informed the WCI process, without further specifying these elements.
During the process of designing the model rule, interviewees reported, general but not many specific 
lessons from the EU ETS played a role. EU prices were used in the development of the model rule.20 The 
organization of trading between the EU countries is another element that instructed MGGRA designers 
when discussing trading between states and provinces.21
4.5 Comparison
The EU ETS played a role in all three North American subnational GHG emissions trading initiatives. In all 
three cases, it did not trigger the inception of the program but once the political accord was concluded, 
lessons from the ETS were included in the program design discussions. Learning was the dominant mecha-
nism in all cases. While the overall observations with regard to the ETS’ role are similar, the details differ 
between RGGI, WCI and MGGRA. The intensity of learning activities, the channels of contact and of trans-
ferring information about the ETS as well as the elements that were transferred differ. Domestic factors in 
the respective states and provinces explain the variance.
The learning activities were most elaborate in the case of WCI, where the most intense exchange between 
EU and North American actors occurred and a large number of elements were analyzed with regard to 
possible lessons for the WCI design. The different degree of learning can be explained by different degrees 
of receptiveness for lessons from the ETS and different levels of ambition of the programs. The receptive-
ness of actors in the states and provinces can be explained by the different ideologies of the actors and the 
overall jurisdictions’ self-perception, the overall public receptiveness to environmental issues and govern-
ment intervention, the industry structure and, related to this, the interests and types of stakeholders as 
well as the history of environmental policy that created path dependencies. These factors differ between 
the three regions that introduced GHG emissions trading initiatives. While an in-depth and detailed study 
of the domestic factors goes beyond the analysis presented in this paper, the interviews confirm that they 
explain the variance.
The different levels of ambition and scope of RGGI, WCI and MGGRA provide explanations for the number 
and type of elements that were transferred. WCI is the most ambitious program with the broadest scope. 
Given this level of complexity, there are more aspects to be considered in the program design, which pro-
vides more entry points for lessons from the EU ETS. Given the ETS’ level of ambition, which can generally 
18 Interviews: Government Agency, Sacramento, 25 May 2012; Government Department, London, 16 May 2012.
19 Interview: Environmental NGO, Seattle, 23 May 2012.
20 Interviews: Environmental Department, Lansing, 1 May 2012; Commerce Department, Springfield, 7 May 2012.
21 Interview: Industry, St. Paul, 30 April 2012.
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be considered relatively high, WCI is the closest to it. This makes ETS elements most relevant and transfer-
able to WCI.
The different channels of contact and EU policy promotion activities can be linked to the politics and ju-
risdictions’ self-perception and ambition as well as the ambition and purpose of the programs. California 
Governor Schwarzenegger had ambitions to place California not only in a leadership position in the domes-
tic context but also to play a global role.22 He signed a Memorandum of Understanding on climate change 
with UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and put the level of ambition of California’s climate policy on a par with 
other nation states such as the UK. In one of his press releases, Governor Schwarzenegger for example 
stated:
“By designing a cap-and-trade program that will achieve our greenhouse gas reduction goals without 
impairing robust economic growth, California has the opportunity to provide a model for the rest of the 
country, and indeed the rest of the world. […] so it is no exaggeration to say that the eyes of the world 
will be upon [our] work.” (Office of Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger 2009)
This commitment to ambitious climate policy contributes to explaining the intensity of the contact be-
tween EU and California experts. The Canadian provinces Quebec and British Columbia are in many ways 
comparable to California.
The overall political interaction between the Northeastern US states with EU Member States and the EU in-
stitutions is less extensive than California’s but nevertheless well-developed. As noted above, the ambition 
and scope of the program is more limited and the reasons for the inception of RGGI are more US-focused. 
Additionally, this region already had experiences with the regional NOX emissions trading program. This 
explains the interest in lessons from the ETS but also from own previous experiences.
The Midwestern states and provinces are most remote from the EU in terms of MGGRA’s level of ambition 
and the aim that the states and provinces wanted to achieve with it. Their goal was to influence possible 
federal legislation so that it accommodates the interests and particularities of the Midwest, which could 
be described as less ambitious with regard to emission reduction goals. Given this domestic focus and the 
relatively large difference between MGGRA and the EU ETS, the demand for contact with EU experts was 
lower in the Midwest than in the Northeast and more so than in the WCI states and provinces.
22 Interviews: Energy Utility, Winnipeg, 26 April 2012; Government Agency, Tucson, 26 April 2012.
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5.  Conclusions
The EU ETS affected North American GHG emissions trading programs. The EU promoted its ETS to different 
degrees in the three cases. The intensity of interaction and policy promotion activities can be explained 
by the demand and receptiveness of the respective North American actors and jurisdictions. This relates 
to factors such as program ambition, the dominant political ideology and the regulatory track record in cli-
mate policy. The dominant mechanism through which the ETS entered North America is learning. Especially 
in the WCI, which is closest to the ETS in terms of its scope and level of ambition, the ETS served as an 
instructive example on many program design issues. Also in the RGGI design process, lessons from the 
ETS instructed the decisions. In the MGGRA model rule design process, some general lessons from the ETS 
were considered. The domestic factors, especially the dominant political ideology, the states’ and prov-
inces’ self-perception and their regulatory history with regard to environmental policy, provide important 
explanations for the higher degree of intensity of contacts and learning in WCI than in MGGRA, with RGGI 
ranging between these two initiatives. The introduction of the EU ETS did not trigger a wave of similar GHG 
emissions trading programs in North America. Nevertheless, the ETS played an important role in the design 
of the North American initiatives, in particular in the WCI and the RGGI. Once domestic factors triggered 
the inception of the North American initiatives, the ETS served as a reference point in the discussions about 
the design of these programs.
The empirical investigation shows that the actors that were chiefly involved in the design of the different 
GHG emissions trading programs engaged in learning from the EU ETS. The ETS contributed to technical 
level discussions amongst different stakeholders, which were involved in the discussions. In the political 
debate, reference to the EU ETS as an aspirational model was almost absent.
The study presented in this paper shows that EU policy can affect policy in other jurisdictions at different 
stages of the policy cycle (Howlett/Ramesh 2003: 11-15). While it could be plausible that EU policy is one 
of the reasons that triggers policy developments in non-EU jurisdictions, this did not happen in the case of 
GHG emissions trading. In this case, the EU ETS entered the policy cycle at the policy formulation stage. The 
policy problem recognition, the politics and the institutional context were favorable to lead to the incep-
tion of RGGI, WCI and MGGRA. This then led to a demand for drawing lessons from the EU experiences. The 
greater compatibility of the domestic factors, program scope and ambitions of WCI with the EU ETS explain 
the greater role of the ETS in this case.
The EU promoted its policy mostly after an initial demand was created in North America. The Memorandum 
of Understanding between California and the UK and the secondment of EU experts to California were sig-
nificantly driven by Governor Schwarzenegger. The EU delivered information mostly when there was some 
demand and a somewhat receptive environment created through the initial placing of GHG emissions 
trading on the respective policy agenda. The effects of the ETS on North American initiatives in the policy 
design phase can thus partially be explained by the fact that the EU engaged mostly in policy promotion 
activities in that phase. This in turn can be explained by the demand in North America for the promotion 
activities. The findings can be instructive to EU policy-makers that are interested in promoting EU policy 
abroad. These actors’ awareness and taking into account of the domestic factors in the respective extra-
EU jurisdiction seems crucial for the success of their efforts. Receptive domestic conditions increase the 
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likelihood for successful promotion of EU policy through learning.
Related to this, oftentimes, learning is not about copy-pasting EU policy. In the cases analyzed in this paper, 
most lessons were drawn from mistakes and “teething problems” of the EU ETS’ first phase. The adapta-
tion to the domestic context in extra-EU jurisdictions often means that the EU provides an instructive and 
helpful experience, which, however, is likely to be adapted to the particular circumstances in the respective 
jurisdiction. These findings can be instructive for EU policy-makers because they provide the insight that 
it is not enough to provide information about the respective EU policy. The extra-EU context is important 
and can most likely best be explored through dialogue with policy-makers from the respective jurisdiction. 
Pro-active communication of lessons about the successful and less successful experiences of the EU with 
its policies combined with awareness of extra-EU jurisdictions’ receptiveness and need for lessons from 
the EU, preferably gained through a dialogue, seems to be a good recipe for successful promotion of EU 
policy abroad. This means that the EU’s activities and the lessons it communicates can differ, depending on 
the extra-EU jurisdiction that it engages with.
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